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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MOON LAKE ELECTRIC ASSOCI-
ATION IN·CORPORATED, a cor-
poration, and UINTAH BASIN 
TELEPHONE ASSOCIATION, 
INC., a corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMIS-
SION, 
Defendant. 1 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Case No. 
9010 
It appears desirable that something of the history 
of the Plaintiff Cooperatives, and those similarly situated 
precede the presentation of the issues and proofs in-
volved in the instant matter. There are eleven such coop-
eratives serving in the State of Utah; four of this number 
are cooperative corporations domiciled in the States of 
Idaho, ·Colorado and Wyoming, while the remaining seven 
are non-profit corporations of the State of Utah. These 
cooperatives are generally referred to as R E A Coopera-
tives, since they are financed by the Rural Electrification 
Administration, an agency of the U. S. Department of 
Agriculture. The Congress ·of the United States created 
this agency in 1936, and the act set out the purpose of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
the Agency as an instrument designed to 'Fznance the 
construction and oper-atvon of generating plants, electric 
transmission .and d~stribut~on lines or systems for the 
furnishzng of electric energy to persons in rural areas 
who are not recet'ving central station service.' 
Later the Act of 1936 was amended to include the 
financing of telephonic service to these same rural areas, 
where no such service was available. It should be pointed 
out that private existing facilities would be given the · 
first opportunity to provide such telephonic service, and 
upon their refusal, the R E A would, upon proper appli-
cation, provide the requested financing. Three such 
telephone cooperatives came into existence; one at 
Orangeville, Emery County, one at Escalante in Garfield 
County and one at Roosevelt, Utah. These three coopera-
tives are non-profit corporations of the State of Utah. 
An applicant desiring to secure the services of REA 
makes an application setting out the proposal it intends 
to follow. This application is examined by R E A and 
ultimately a plan is agreed upon between the applicant 
and the engineering and planning division of R E A. 
The management of the cooperative is vested in the 
cooperative, subject to the approval of the Administrator 
of this Federal Agency. Many management matters are 
controlled by the managing body of the Cooperative. 
Rates are fixed by the Cooperative subject to their ap-
proval by R E A. When the plans have been agreed upon 
a Loan Contract is entered into between the Cooperative 
and the United States of America. The Cooperative se-
cures the Government for the money so advanced, with 
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a first mortgage on all real and personal property owned 
by it. As additional plant or equipment is needed, the 
Loan Contract is amended to include these additions and 
improvements. At no time can a cooperative borrow fror.o 
any other institution or agency. 
There are some seven to eight thousand members 
being presently served by the various electric and tele-
phone cooperatives in the State of Utah. (This will ap-
proximate some 25 to 30 thousand rural people.) A 
consumer, patron or subscriber must be a member of the 
cooperative before he or it can be served. Each member 
is required to pay a reasonable membership fee. Each 
member of a telephone cooperative is required to pay, in 
addition to this membership fee, a payment of $45.00 
which is termed an equity. 
Since the people thus served fall within the lower in-
come groups, the rate fixed is placed at a level that will 
theoretically yield sufficient revenue to provide for debt 
service, replacement and operating costs; due to compet-
ing rates of public utilities in adjacent areas, this level 
of rates has not yet been achieved. Any appreciable raise 
in rates will further depress and lessen the income per 
mile of line, since the consumer is not disposed to pay 
more for a service than a like service is costing in adja-
cent areas at or near the level of rates charged by power 
and telephone companies serving in adjacent areas. 
It is believed that this brief and general picture may 
assist the Court in the determination of the issues in-
volved in this matter. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiffs in this cause, and those similarly situ-
ated, have been, since their beginning, assessed and taxed 
as is provided in the following Sections of the Utah Code 
1953: 
8 ection 16-6-16 U C A 1953: 
"Property of cooperative nonprofit electric cor-
porations organized under this chapter and opera-
ting facilities financed pursuant to the Rural 
Electrification Act of 1936, shall not be valued for 
the purpose of ad valorem taxation in excess of 
$50.00 times the number of miles or primary dis-
tribution of transmission lines.'' 
Sect~on 16-6-17 U C A 1953, as amended: 
"Property of cooperative nonprofit telephone 
corporations organized under this chapter and fi-
nanced pursuant to the United States Rural Elec-
trification Act of 1936 as amended, shall not be 
valued for the purpose of ad valorem taxation in 
excess if $10.00 times the number of circuit miles 
of line constituting the telephone system." 
Sometime prior to July of 1958 the Chairman of the 
State Tax Commission of the State of Utah Addressed 
an inquiry to the Attorney General of the State of Utah, 
asking these questions : 
(1) Is Section 16-6-16 U C A 1953, constitutionaB 
(2) Is Section 16-6-17 U C A 1953, constitutionaH 
( 3) Should the property of the Moon Lake Electric 
Association be assessed by the State Tax Com-
mission, rather than by the County .Assessor? 
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On July 2nd, 1958 the Attorney General sent to the 
State Tax Commission an opinion wherein he held that 
questions (1) and (2) should be answered in the negative, 
while the third question was answered in the affirmative. 
On September 3, 1958, the Attorney representing the 
State Tax Commission advised the Plaintiffs in this 
cause and all other electric and telephone cooperatives 
doing business in the State of Utah to this effect: 
"You are no doubt aware that on July 2nd, 1958, the 
Attorney General of Utah advised this office that in his 
opinion Sections 16-6-16 and 17, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, were unconstitutional. 
This will advise you, therefore, that the State Tax 
Commission intends to assess the property belonging to 
Moon Lake Electric Ass'n., Inc., according to the same 
formulas which are applied to other utilities operating 
in more than one County in the State of Utah. 
Very truly yours, 
John Marshall, Attorney 
Division of Law." 
While we differ strenuously with the Attorney Gen-
eral on the question of the constitutionality of the two 
sections of the ·Code, we do agree that the property of a 
cooperative, or other utility, "when they are operated as 
a unit in more than one County *** must be assessed by 
the State Tax Commission ***" 
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STATEMENT OF POIN·TS 
POINT I 
DO SEoCTIONS 16-6-16 AND 16-6-17 VIOLATE SEC-
TIONS 2 AND 3 OF ARTI1CLE XIII OF THE CONSTITU-
TION OF 'THE STATE OF UTAH; 
POINT II 
DO THESE SAME SECTIONS OF THE CODE VIOLATE 
SECTION 26 OF ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION? 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
POINT I 
Section 2 of Article XIII of the Constitu-
tion provides in part: "All tangible property in 
the State, not exempt under Laws of the United 
States, or under this constitution, shall be taxed 
in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as 
provided by law*** (Emphasis added.) 
"'The Legislature shall provide by law a uni-
form and equal rate of assessment and taxation 
on all tangible property in the state according 
to its value in money***." (Emphasis added.) 
In presenting the argument and authorities cover-
ing the two points raised, the plaintiff finds some diffi-
culty in limiting its proof to the respective points. The 
question of "assessment and taxation . . . according to 
value in money" as required by Article 13 of the Con-
stitution, and the further question raised by Section 
26 of Article 6, Constitution of Utah, prohibiting "priv-
ate or special laws affecting the assess1nent and col-
lection of taxes and the granting to an individual asso-
ciation or corporation any privilege, imn1unity or fran-
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chise," are so inter-related and so interwoven, that it 
is quite impossible to keep these two subjects distinct 
and apart. 
It is the plaintiff's contention that we must first 
determine a method or formula for determining this 
question of "value in money" then supply such forr11ula 
as will enable the taxing authorities to arrive at a base 
upon which the levy can be made. The only fonnula 
or rule that can find general acceptance in the classi·-
fication of property. If this classification prescribed by 
law is such that if the uniforn1 and equal rate of taxation 
is applied, the property is then taxed in the same pro-
portion to its value as is aU other tangible property, the 
method of arriving at the assessed valuation is not 
subject to constitutional objections. 
It may be contended that classification must be 
employed if we are to have uniformity as required 
in Article 13 of our Constitution and it may well be 
urged that such classification contravenes Section 26 of 
Article 6, in that such classification becomes special or 
private in its application. 
The opinion of the Attorney General holding these 
sections unconstitutional, concedes that legislation is 
valid, and the enactments must be sustained unless in 
violation of fundamental law. 
This opinion holds that the language uaccording to 
its value in money" means that all property shall be 
valued, for the purpose of assessment, as near as is 
reasonably practicable, at its full cash value; in other 
words, that the valuation for assessment and taxation 
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shall be as near as is reasonably practicable, equal to the 
cash price fO'r which the property valued would sell in 
open market) for thiJs is doubtless the correct test of 
the value of property. (Emphasis added.) 
In reaching the above conclusion the Attorney Gen-
eral refers to the case of ast~ate v. Thomas7 16 U 86, 50 P. 
615." There can be little dispute over the language of 
the Court in this case, yet it leaves some doubt as to 
how the State Tax Commission or a County Assessor 
could use this formula or yardstick to enable it or him 
to place a value upon any given property. The saleability 
of property is inexorably tied to many factors. It can 
hardly be contended that any taxing body could give 
effect to the provisions of Section 2 and 3 of Article 
XII, if their only instruction was to this effect: "You 
will place a value upon property in an amount equal to 
the price the property would sell for in the open market." 
It must be admitted that the Legislature did provide 
rules which it presumptively had a right to do, which 
rules are set out in the Section 16-6-16 and 16-6-17. 
There can be no doubt that in the assessment and tax-
ation of property, the Constitution intended that all 
taxable property shall bear its just proportion of the 
burdens of taxation. With this end result there can 
be no dispute. The practical problem of reaching this 
end result is quite a different thing. 
The Thomas case did define the language "accord-
ing to its value in money" as applied to assessment and 
taxation, to mean "Equal to the cash price for which 
the property valued would sell in open market, for this 
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is doubtless the correct test of the value of property.'' 
If we accept this definition as the measure of "value 
in money", then we would be cmnpelled to make this 
determination before we could fix an assessment and 
levy a tax. If the various types and classifications of 
taxable property had a recognized market value, the 
problem would be reasonably simple. Actually, as a 
practical matter, various type of property are not fre-
quently bought and sold on this open market, hence fix-
ing a market value on such property would be, at best, 
a speculative thing. As Justice Cordozo said in W ~lliams 
v. Mayor and Cvty Counci'l of B1altimore: 
"Time with its tides brings new conditions 
which must be cared for by new laws. Sometimes 
the new conditions affect the members of a class. 
If so, the correcting statute may be as narrow 
as the mischi,ef. The Constitution does not pro-
hibit special laws inflexibly and always. It per-
mits them where there are special evils with 
which the general laws are incompetent to 
cope***" (Emphasis added) 
Because of the complexities of this problem, the 
legislature has in many instances provided a yard-
stick or formula which will enable the assessing and 
taxing authorities to arrive at these market values. 
This approach by the Legislature is done pursuant to 
constitutional mandate. (Section 2 of Article XIII pro-
vides: "* * * shall be taxed in proportion to its value, 
to be ascertained as provided by law." (Emphasis add-
ed), while Section 3 of the same Article 13 provides 
"* * * acording to its value in money * * * to be ascer-
tained as provided by law) * * *" (Emphasis added.) 
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This ·Court in more recent cases has, we believe, 
qualified the rule as announced in the Thomas case. 
It must be kept in mind that the Constitution is 
applicable to every conceivable kind of property, any-
where within the jurisdiction of the State. To contend 
that the legislature must avoid a 1neans calculated to 
give efect to the language of the Constitution by gen-
eralizing as to value, is a contention that can find little 
warrant in legal terminology or the practicality of any 
given situation. Land is assessed on the basis of its area; 
livestock on a per head basis; mines are usually assessed 
on its area together with some formula calculated to 
arrive at its worth. These illustration could be multi-
plied without end. This thing value is a relative term, 
affected and influenced by use, location, earning power 
and a variety of factors too numerous to mention. There 
must be classifiJcati•on of property if there iJs to be com-
pliance wiJth these ConstiJtutional provisions. (Emphasis 
added.) 
In the case entitled State ex rel Public Service Com-
mission v. Southern Pacific Co., reported in 79 Pac. 2nd 
at page 25 (A Utah case) the Court had this to say: 
"The fair value as a rate base and the value 
in money for purposes of taxation of a public 
utility are not necessarily the same," and the 
Court goes on to say: "For the purposes of tax-
ation of a publvc utility, where it is the present 
value of property in nwney that is to be deter-
mi"YYed, the present, past, and prospective future 
capacity to earn and the market value of sto~ks 
and bonds of the utility for a reasonable peno,d 
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antecedent to the making of the assessment con-
stitutes the most rel~able influential evidence of 
value." 
The Court in the instant case makes these 
further observations concerning the question of 
value: "The elements to be cons~dered fo·r deter-
miming value of .a publiJc ut~lity' s property for 
purposes of taxation are original or historical 
cost, cost of reproduction, less depreciation, con-
ditions of competition in the imdustry, effVci·ency 
or lack of i·t in man.agement, bonded tnde:bted!Jfess, 
current market val~te of stocks .and bonds, actual 
present earn~ngs and earnings over a period of 
years." (Emphasis added) 
This Court has on frequent occasions considered 
this matter of value in its tax application. One of its 
most recent decisions is that contained in the case en-
titled "UniJted States Smelt~ng Refining & Mining Co., 
v. H,aynes, County Treasurer." reported in 176 P. 2nd. 
at page 622. Although the factual situation differs, yet 
the Court had occasion to consider the same constitu-
tional matters as are here involved. The Haynes case 
involved the construction of a statute relative to de-
termining the base or valuation of metalliferous mines 
for tax purposes. The Appellant contended in the Haynes 
case that to include premium payments in "proceeds 
realized" for the purpose of determining the valuation 
of the mine for assessment purposes, would violate the 
constitutional requirements as to uniformity of assess-
ments and taxation as required by Sections 2, 3 and 4 
of Article XIII, Constitution of Utah, and Section 8 
of Article I, and Section I of 14th. Amendment to the 
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Constitution of the United States. In considering this 
contention of the Appellant, the Court had this to say: 
"It will be observed that these provisions 
(Sections 2, 3 and 4 of Article 13 of the Consti-
tution of the State of Utah) require that all tan-
gible property, including metalliferous mines, 
shall be subjected to a uniform and equal rate 
of assessment according to its value in money. 
The method or yardstick by which the valwation 
.in money is to be determined shall be prescribed 
by the Legislature. It is not required that the 
same yardstick or method of determining value 
shall be used with respect to .all k~nds of prop-
erty. But the different formulae which may be 
applied to different kinds of prope.rty must be 
such that they aim and tend to secure for assess-
ment purposes OJ valuation fair and equiJtable in 
comparison w~th and commensurate with the 
valuaNon of other kinds of property. When the 
valuatiion thus secured is such that if the uni-
form and equal rate of taxation is applied the 
property is t.axed in the came proportion to its 
value as is all other tangible property, the meth-
od of arriving at the assessed valuation is not 
subject to constitutiJonal objections as violative 
of Artvcle XIII." (Emphasis added) 
It is conceded that the statutory method of valuing 
metalliferous mines for taxation purposes at $5 per 
acre plus a multiple or sub-multiple of the net proceed'3 
is a proper and constitutional forn1ula for determining 
the value of the 1nines for assessment purposes. See 
South Utah Mines .and Smelters 'V. Beaver County, 262 
U.S. 325, 43 S. Ct. 577, 67 L. Ed. 1004; JIIercur Gold 
M~n~ng & Milling Co. v. Spry, 16 lT. 222 52 P. 382; Salt 
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Lake County v. Utah Copper Co. 10 cir., 294 F. 199; 
Tintic St.andard Jl,fining Co. v. Utah County, 80 Utah 
491, 15 P. 2nd. 633; Byrne v. Fulton Ovl Co., 85 Mont. 
329, 278 P. 314. 
But it is argued that to include premium payments 
in the gross proceeds of mines violates the rule because: 
(a) it amounts to classification of mines into different 
groups for taxation purposes. (b) in determining the 
value of the mine in 1944, it takes into consideration 
the production of the mine 1941 as well as the proceeds 
in 1943. (c) The value of the mine would be based in-
versely upon the production quotas fixed by the Govern-
ment instead of upon the net proceeds. (d) It amounts 
to fixing values upon gross costs rather than upon net 
proceeds. The argument to sustain these points are rath-
er abstruse and tenuous. Instead of anlyzing and answer-
ing each argument, we shall consider the basic question 
and therein dispose of all points raised. 
The Court then goes on to consider the question of 
whether the inclusion of premium payment infringes the 
uniformity clause of the Constitution. The Court has 
this to say: 
"Use of proceeds as a basis for determining 
valuation for taxation purposes has been used 
not only for mines but railroads, motor carriers, 
and other public utilities. The uniformity clause, 
when applied to formulae based on proceeds, does 
not require that all individuals or companies with-
in the class to which the formula is applied have 
the same income or the same source of obtaining 
their proceeds but merely that the rule for com-
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putation of proceeds apply alike, uniformly, to 
all within the class to which the proceeds formu-
la applies." 
The Court in the Haynes case quotes with approval 
the case of Bt.ate v. Great Northern R. Co., 174 Minn. 3, 
218 N.W. 167, 169, in which case a railroad complained 
because of its assessrn_ent based on gross earnings; the 
railroad had enjoyed a windfall because of certain ore 
contracts. The law was assailed on the ground that it 
Inight result in a highe::.· tax on one railroad than on 
another although the cost of building and replacing the 
roadbed of each would be the same. The Court said: 
"The taxing authorities must take gross earnings as they 
find them. They do not fix earnings * * * Large earn-
ings give value, and the road has a unitary value which 
cannot be disregarded * * * such earnings give the 
defendant's property great value which reflects itself 
in taxes." 
In the case entitled: Anaconda Copper Mining Co. v 
Jttnod, 71 Mont. 132, 227 P. 1001, which case involved 
again the computation of net proceeds, and the Appel-
lant complained that to apply the rule would violate 
the application of the unifor1nity of assessment clause 
of the Constitution. The Court in answer to this claim 
had this to say: "The Constitutional requirements of 
uniformity and equality were not violated because some 
mines had bigger incon1es or sn1aller expenses on the 
same mining operations." 
It is not difficult to find a Inultitude of cases where-
in this question of value, has received the close and 
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scrutinizing attention of many Courts, both State and 
Federal. As the tax burden ever increases in local, 
County, State and Federal spheres, it is fair to assume 
that this matter of value will ever grow more provoca-
tive. It is difficult to conceive of an expression more 
difficult to define, one more widely misunderstood, than 
the value of any article, or service. Rates based on 
value, taxation linked to value, these and the many 
other facets of the word, has yet to find common ac-
ceptance. The unquenchable hunger for more taxes, and 
the diminishing types of property, which can be reached 
for revenue, combine to make this problem one of con-
cern to the people who pay, and the unit of government 
bent on spending. How far beyond its present level 
this tax and spend orgy can go, poses a problem that 
confounds he who makes even a casual inquiry into its 
effect. It is not the purpose of the authors of this pre-
sentation to avoid its just share of this common bur-
den. It is our earnest contention that "value" or its 
"value in money" as used in the Constitution can and 
is best arrived at by the formula or method set out 
in Sections 16-6-16 and 16-6-17 DCA 1953. 
In Parson v. Detroit & Canada Tunnel Co., 15 F. 
Supp 986 ( 1936) and affirmed 92 F. (2nd.) 893 ( 1937), 
the taxpayer operated a tunnel between Detroit and 
Windswor, Canada. Its property was required to be 
taxed at its true cash value. The total cost of the prop-
erty was over $3,600,000. Its replacement cost was ap-
proximately $2,500,000. During 1932, 1933 and 1934, the 
property was annually assessed at over $3,500,000. A 
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fair capitalization of earnings showed a valuation of 
approximately $850,000. The Court found that the tunnel 
company had operated efficiently and economically, and 
that all reasonable efforts had been made to increase 
its income and reduce its expenses. 
The District Court, in rejecting the assessment 
based solely on original cost less depreciation, said 
(page 997): 
"It is well established principle of law in 
arriving at the true cash value, within the pro-
visions of the Michigan Laws and other similar 
statutes of a single purpose, public utility prop-
erty, such as here involved, whose only value is 
derived from its capacity to earn money by its 
use for a definite single purpose, the so-called 
o.apiJtalizatiJon of net income method sometimes 
calle:d the net earntng methods, should be given 
.a primary and paramount weight either as the 
sole method of valuations or used in combination 
with the stock and bond valuation method, so-
called, whe-re as in the present case, it appears 
that the property has received economical and 
prudent management and that such method shows 
a valuation substantially less than the depreciated 
cost of such property, as to render an assessment 
based on such cost clearly and grossly excessive 
and arbitr.ary." (Underscoring supplied.) 
The Court accordingly reduced the assessment from 
$3,600,000.00 to $848,000 for each of the ~-ears in ques-
tion, basing the new assessment solely on the earning 
power of the property. 
The Circuit Court of apeals for the 6th Circuit 
Court affirmed the above decision of the District Court. 
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In its op1n10n, reported in 92 F ( 2d) 833 at page 836, 
the Court said : 
"It is clear that if the assessments made by 
the taxing authorities were so grossly excessive 
as to be unreasonable, and were arrived at by 
the adoption of fundamentally wrong principles, 
they were not final and a Federal Court of Equity 
has power to grant relief because taxation based 
upon such valuations deprives the company of its 
property and denies it the equal protection of 
the law * * *" "The assessors and reviewing 
boards del~berately refused to take tnto consiJd-
eration the earnings or e~arniJng power of the tun-
nel property as factors in determining its cash 
value for taxation purposes, Thus the most fun-
damental element tn value w.as set at naught * * * 
(p. 837), There is JJJ) evidence that the taxing 
authorities were guilty of any actual fraud, but 
we think _that, in persistently adhering to cost 
less depreciation as a formula for arriving at 
'true cash value' and in ignoring the capitalized 
income method adopted by both the master and 
the Court, they proceeded upon a fundamentally 
wrong basis." (Underscoring supplied.) 
In People ex. rel. Lehigh Vtalley Ry Co. v. Harris, 
168 Misc. 685, 6 NY.S. (2d) 794 (1938) affirmed by the 
New York ·Court of Appeals 281 N.Y. 786, 24 N. B. (2d) 
476 (1939) The Court said: 
"The Empire State Building is a valuable 
property, not only because of the large sum of 
money expended in its construction, but on ac-
count of its location in the business center of 
New York City, where the demand for stores and 
offices is great. In arriving at its value for assess-
ment purposes its reconstruction cost would be 
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an important item in deterrnining that amount. 
But would anyone be bold as to suggest that, if 
the building were to be taken out of its environ-
ment and placed in the center of the Adirondack 
Mountains, remote from business activity, and 
where few, if any tenants were to be found to 
occupy the offices and stores, and the revenue 
to be derived from rentals would be practically 
nothing, the construction cost would then be de-
cisive of the value of the building~ Would a rai·l-
road three hundred miles long, connecUng two 
important industrial centers, and running through 
a prosperous and thickly inhabt"'ied country, be 
as valuable as one of the s.ame length built in the 
w~lds where but few people resiJded, and where 
there was no industrial or business activity? Yet 
the reconstruction cost of the two ro:ads would be 
substant~ally the same. To ask these questions is 
but to answer them * * *" (Underscoring sup-
plied.) 
The case ofState v. Illinois C. R. Co., 27 ill. 64, in 
volved the taxation of the property of a railroad com-
pany under a constitutional provision that "every per-
son and corporation shall pay a ta..c~ in proportion to the 
value of his or her property." 
In holding that the present earning capacity of such 
property is of prime in1portant in determining value 
for taxation, the Court said: 
"Where property has a known and determ-
inate value ascertained by commerce in vt, as 
in most kinds of personal property, or f.ixed by 
law, as money, there can be no difficulty. But 
there are so many kinds of property as to which 
the assessor has no such satisfactory guVde. Such 
is peculia·rly the case with riailro'ad property 
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and other similar property. In such oases, the in-
quiry should be, What vs the property worth to 
be used for the purpose for whvch it is con-
structed, ,and not for any other purpose to whiJch 
it might be applied or converted, or for which 
it mvght be used. In such cases, if the property 
is devo·ted to the use for whvch U was designed 
and is in a condition to produce its maximum 
tncome, one very innporbant element for ascer-
taining its present value is discovered and that 
is net profits." (Emphasis added.) 
In State v. Hall~day, 61 Ohio St. 352, 56 N. B. 118 
( 1899), the Court said, 
" ... That the income-producing oapacity of an 
.artvcle is ,an important factor in determining vts 
value is so obvious as to seem beyond the bounds 
of controversy. This doctrine was sanctioned in 
its application to real estate in State v. Jones, 51 
Ohio St. 513, 37 N. E. 945, and in Express Co. v. 
Ohio State Auditor, 166 U.S. 220, 17 Sup. Ct. 504 
41 L. Ed. 965, and no reason .is perce1med, nor h.as 
·any been assigned, why a prt"nciple so plain and 
just should not be applved universally to all specves 
of property. This is the first inquiry that .a pru-
dent Prospective purchaser would make . .. " (Ital-
ics added.) 
Floyd v. M anufactur'ers' Light & Heat Comp.any, 
111 Ohio St. 57 144 N. E. 703 (1924) 
"The true value in money of any property is af-
fected by the same considerations throughout as 
would render the property desir,able as an imvest-
ment. (Italics added.) 
People ex rel. Walki:ZZ Valley R. Co. v. Keater, 36 
Hun. 592; affirmed 101 N. Y. 610 3 N. E. 903 
(1885). 
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It would seem unwise to burden this brief with ex-
tensive quotations from the authorities. The problem has 
arisen in most states under statutes having a similar 
meaning and calling for assessment at "fair value'' or 
"True value" or "Cash value" or the equivalent of these 
phrases. The courts have held uniformly that earning 
power is the most important and accurate index of valu~ 
in the tax assessment of property of this kind. Without 
attempting an exhaustive citation, the following cases are 
typical: 
Trustees of the Cincinnati Southern Ry. v. Guen-
teher, 19 F. 395 (1884) 
Railroad & Tele:ph. Cos. v. Bd. of Eqwalizers, 85 
Fed. 302 ( 1897) 
Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Eveland, 13 F. (2d) 
442 (19·26) 
Stein v. Mobile, 17 Ala. 234 (1850). 
Harvey Bldg. Corp. v. Bannon, 191 So. 784 (Fla. 
1939). 
Cleaveland C. C. and St. L. Co. v. Backus, 133 Ind. 
513, 33 N E. 421 (1894) aff'd 154 U.S. 439,38 
L. Ed. 1041 (1894). 
State ex rel. Bee Bldg. Co. v. Savage, 65 Neb. 714, 
91 N. W. 716 (1902) 
Western Union Telegriaph Co. v. Dodge County, 
80 Neb. 18, 113 N. W. 805 (1907) aff'd 80 Neb. 
23, 117 N. W. 468 (1908). 
State v. Virg~n~a & T. R. Co., 24 Neb. 53, 49 Pac. 
945 (1897) 
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State v. Nevada Cent. R. Co., 28 Nev. 186, 81 Pac. 
99 (1905) 
People ex. rel. Ogdensburg & L. C. R. Co. vs. Pond. 
13 Abb. N. C. 1 (N.Y. 1882.) 
People ex. rel. Fitchburg R. Co., v. Raren, 50 Hun. 
605, 3 N.Y. Supp. 86 (1888) 
People ex. rel. Powers v. Kalbfleisch, 25 App. Div. 
432 49 N. Y. Supp. 546 (1898) appeal dis-
missed 156 N. Y. 678, 50 N. E. 1121 (1898) 
People ex. rel. Buffalo & S. L. R. Co. v. Freder-
icks, 48 Barb. 173 (N.Y. 1860) aff'd 48 N.Y. 
70 (1871) 
People ex. rel. Dela & H. Canal Co. v. K eetor 2 
How. Prac. (N.S.) 479 (N. Y. 1885) 
People ex. rel. Dela & H. Canal Co. v. Roose 2 
How. Prac. (N. S.) 454 (N. Y. 1885) 
LouiseviJlle & N. R. Co. v. State, 55 Tenn. 663 
(1875) 
Franklin County v. N.ashvvlle C. & St. L. R. Co. 
80 Tenn. 
State v. Pullman Co., 178 Wise. 240, 189 N. W. 548 
(1922) 
Summarizing the rules of law laid down by these 
cases, the following statements of the courts are exactly 
applicable to the valuation of the property of rural 
electric cooperatives : 
It is a cardinal rule which should never be forgotten 
that whatever property is worth for the purposes of in-
come and sale it is also worth for purposes of taxation. 
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':rhe income-producing capacity of an article is an 
important factor in determining its value and this is the 
first inquiry that prudent prospective purchaser would 
make. 
Particularly pertinent to a rural electric system is 
the above-quoted New York Case of People v. Harris 6 
N.Y. S. (2d)794, in which the ·Court stated as self-evident 
that a railroad line of equal length .and cost in more 
sparsely settled rural areas could nO't possibly be as valu-
able .as a railroad line in 1nore prosperous are.as. Similar-
ly, the original cost of the rural electric line or its re-
placement cost has little or no significance with reference 
to value for tax purposes. An electric distribution line in 
prosperous, thickly settled areas might have net earnings 
of $10,000 a year; but would a similar line constructed 
at exactly the same cost but operating in a sparsely set-
tled, less profitable area, have the same value for pur-
poses of tax assessment~ As stated by the New York 
Court, merely to ask this question is to answer it. A 
prudent investor would pay many times as much for the 
more profitable property, exercising his common sense 
business judgment that it would be many times more 
profitable and correspondingly more valuable. Valuation 
for tax purposes must be regarded as the same in value 
"for purposes of income and sale." 
In most states, the taxing authorities have assessed 
the property of rural electric cooperatives at sums much 
less than $100 per mile. In a great majority of states, the 
assessments have been considerably less than this figure 
for the early development years before earning power 
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has been established. There is nothing peculiar in tax 
assessments that are below the book value of the prop-
erty. Whatever may be the justification of this practice 
with respect to highly profitable enterprises that have 
reached full earning power, it is abundantly clear, under 
court decisions of every state, that valuation based upon 
earning power is peculiarly appropriate to the enter-
prises here under discussion. This is not because they are 
cooperatives but because of the kind of territory in which 
they operate. A stock corporation organized for profit 
and operating in similar territory, should of course be 
assessed on the same basis and with the same results. It 
is a fundamental theory of all kinds of taxation that taxes 
should be adjusted according to the ability to pay. This 
is true of ad valorem assessments of business property 
of this kind since the value of the property is in direct 
ratio to net earnings. Excessive taxation, beyond ability 
to pay, will jeopardize the successful development of 
these new enterprises. If they are not unduly burdened 
by operating costs in their early and development years 
they will contribute increasingly, both directly and indi-
rectly, to the taxable wealth of the community. 
From a practical standpoint, assessment at actual 
value based upon earning power (even though less than 
$100 a mile has been the practice in most states) has not 
been prejudicial to the administration of local govern-
ment. These properties, at any rate, constitute new wealth 
which was not existent when current tax rates were es-
tablished. They do not add to the cost of government as 
is true of many kinds of new property which increase 
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the need for greater expenditures for education, roads, 
etc. In many indirect ways they add to the wealth and 
prosperity of the rural communities which they serve. In 
calling attention to these facts we do not imply that they 
are entitled to favored treatment by tax officials unless 
such encouragement is authorized by the legislature. 
vVha t we do mean is that there is every reason, both in 
law and in practical tax administration for tax assess-
ments at their true value based upon earning power and 
upon present ability to pay. 
POINT II. 
Are Section 16-6-16 and 16-6-17 U C A 1953 
unconstitutional as violative of Section 26 of Ar-
ticle 6 of the Constitution of Utah, which prohibits 
special laws affecting: (1) assessing and collect-
ing taxes, and ( 2) granting to an individual, as-
sociation or corporation any privilege, immunity 
or franchise. 
The Attorney General in his July 2nd opinion, and 
the Defendant in its Answer, complain that the two Sec-
tions of the Code contravene Artcile 6 of the Constitution, 
since the Code Sections are limited in their application 
and result in "identification" rather than a legitimate 
classification. 
ARGUMENT 
'The plaintiff contends that the following authorities 
plainly indicate that this position of the Defendant is 
not tenable. May we call to the attention of this Court an 
Indiana case entitled: TAX COMMISSION v. J.A·CK-
SON 283 U.S. Reports 527 (Indiana case): 
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In this case the State of Indiana required that a 
business must before it could operate, secure a license. 
The license fee was a graduated one; a single owned store 
was permitted to secure such a license by the payment of 
a fee much less than a store belonging to a chain. The 
chain contended that the classification was arbitrary and 
unconstitutional. It was contended by the chains that 
there was no difference between the operation of a singly 
owned store and one of a chain. The trial court held that 
"all persons engaged in the operation of one or more 
stores *** belong to the same class, for occupational tax 
purposes*** and should pay the same license fee, regard-
less of the number of stores owned and operated by 
them." And that any other other classification is arbi-
trary and unconstitutional. 
The U. S. Supreme Court on· appeal said: "The 
power of taxation is fundamental to the very existence 
of the government of the States. The restriction that it 
shall not be so exercised as to deny to any the equal pro-
tection of the laws, does not compel the adoption of an 
iron rule of equal taxation, nor prevent variety or differ-
ences in taxation of properties, nuisances, trades, callings 
or occupations. (Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Penn. 134 U. S. 
Reports 232; Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas 217 U. S. 
Reports 114; Brown-Foreman Co. v. Kentucky 217 U. S. 
Reports 563.) 
The fact that a statute discriminates in favor of a 
certain class does not make it arbitrary, if the discrimina-
tion is founded upon a reasonable distinction. See: Ameri-
can Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana 179 U. S. 89; or 
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if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived to sus-
tain it. (Rast v. ·van Dernan 240 U. S. Reports 342.) 
This Court in the case of GARRETT FREIGHT 
LINES v. STATE TAX COMMISSION et al, a Utah 
case decided in 1943, and reported in 135 P. 2nd. at page 
523, said this: 
"·Collateral purposes or motives of a legislature in 
levying a tax of a kind within the reach of its lawful 
power are matters beyond the scope of judicial inquiry 
*** nor may a tax within the lawful power of a state be 
judicially stricken down under the due process clause 
simply because its enforcement may or will result in re-
stricting or even destroying particul~r occupations or 
businesses ***" 
This Court then quoted with approval the case of 
NICOL v. AMES 173 U. S. 509 and KNOWLTON v. 
~100RE 178 U. S. at page 41. In the Nicol case the Su-
preme Court made this observation: "Taxation is emi-
nently practical, and is in fact brought to every man's 
door; and for the purpose of deciding upon its validity, 
a tax should be regarded in its actual, practical results 
rather than with reference to those theoretical or abstract 
ideas whose correctness is the subject of dispute and 
contradiction among those who are experts in the science 
of political econon1y." 
This Court in the the Garret case then goes on: "The 
abilvty to bear the burden is everywhere recognized as 
reasonable grO'und upon whvch to baBe a classification in 
ta:r measures." In conclusion we reiterate a statement 
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heretofore made by this Court: "It i's too well settled to 
requ.ire more than passtng mention that State Constitu-
tions are mere limitat~ons ~and not grants of power. It is 
equally settled that the power of vaxation is a legislattve 
function, and unless restrained by the Constitution, the 
exercise of this power i~s vested in the leyiJslature and its 
power over the subject i's plenary and supreme.'' (See 
Salt Lake ·City v. Christensen Go., 34 U. 38: 95P. 523.) 
I believe it is a fair conclusion that the rule adopted 
in the case of BROWN-FORMAN CO. v. KEN'TUCKY, 
Reported in 217 U. S. at page 342, fairly states the atti-
tude of both State and Federal Courts with reference to 
this matter of classification; the U S. Supreme Court in 
the Brown-Forman case concluded: "A very wide discre-
t~on must be conceded to the legislative: power of the St,ate 
in the classifi;cation of trades, callings, businesses or oc-
cupations which may be subjected to spedal forms of 
regulation or taxation through an exdse or license tax. 
c If the selection or classiji)cation is neither caprvcious nor 
ill:· arb~trary, rand rests upon some re1asonable consideration 
~~ of difference or poliJcy, there; iJs no deniJal of the equal pro-
tection of the law." 
Rural electric cooperatives ask no special tax status 
unless such is conferred by proper legislation as has been 
~irr· done in certain states. They ask only that they be as-
sessed according to sound principles, guaranteed by fed-
eral and state constitutions and established by decisions 
of the courts. It is thoroughly established as a fundamen-
tal principle of sound taxation that earning power is the 
most important criterion of value with respect to business 
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properties of this kind. As stated by the United States 
Supreme Court in Adams Express Co. vs. Ohio State 
Auditor 166 U S. 18'5 41 L. ed. 965, 977 (1897), 
"Now, it is a cardinal rule which should never be 
forgotten that whatever property is worth for the 
purposes of income and sale, it is also worth for 
purposes of taxatvon" 
The courts have said, over and over again, that such 
property is worth only what a prudent investor would 
pay for it. What is it that a prudent investor does in 
reaching his estimate of the value of a property~ He con-
siders earning power-sometimes as his sole criterion of 
value, always as his most important criterion. He is not 
primarily interested in the construction cost or the re-
placement cost. It is largely immaterial to him that the 
construction cost - let us say - was $100,000. If the 
property has no earning power, or very little earning 
power, he would be willing to pay only a small fraction 
of that amount. To arrive at the value of the property~ 
the prudent investor ascertains its net earning power. In 
arriving at net earnings he necessarily includes a fair 
deprciation charge as an iten1 of expense. This is in 
accord with elementary principles of sound business ac-
counting. There can be no continuing gross income -
let alone, net incmne - unless proper replacements are 
made as the property wears out. A reserve for such re-
placements must necessarily be set up as a charge against 
gross earnings. After arriving at the annual net earnings 
which the property is able to yield, he capitalizes such 
amount at the rate of return which prudent investment 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29 
requires for the property in question. If it is a business 
of little risk with established and stable earning power, a 
proper rate of capitalization might be five or six per 
cent. For a new business or one with uncertain future 
earning power a proper rate might well be ten per cent. 
There is nothing new in this method of arriving at 
the value of business properties for purposes of tax 
assessment. It is a principle that has been long estab-
lished in tax administration and has been insisted upon 
by the courts. The only problem that is new is the factual 
situation to which this old principle must be applied. 
The new and special fact situation is this. These 
properties of rural electric cooperatives would not and 
could not have come into being by the usual investment 
of capital seeking a profit. They have been financed by 
the United States Government through the Rural Electri-
fication Adminstration because of the great public 
problem that is inherent in rural electrification. ·They 
represent an unprecendented investment in a type of 
electric power and light properties that has extremely 
low earning power. They are constructed in sparsely 
settled rural areas where private capital has been unwill-
ing or unable to go. They ask no favored treatment; they 
recognize that they should be taxed according to estab-
lished principles of valuation; but they claim that the 
proper application of these principles leads to far differ-
ent results (at least in their early years of development) 
than would be true with respect to properties of greater 
earning power. 
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The purposes which have led to the creation of this 
new wealth are highly relevant to the question of valua-
tion for tax purposes. These rural electric lines are of 
incalculable value to the communities they serve; but for 
tax purpose they should be valued according to ability to 
pay. Any other theory of tax assessment not only is un-
sound as a matter of law, but might make it impossible 
for these new enterprises to prosper and render adequate 
service to the life and wealth of the communities they 
serve. Agriculture contfuues to be one of the cornerstones 
of our civilization. But the widening gap between rural 
and urban standards of life and work has become a prob-
lem of major public concern in almost every state. It is 
an accepted fact that electricity is no longer a luxury but 
is a common convenience and necessity in the American 
economy of business and in home life. The farm is a place 
of business as well as a horne, and under present day 
conditions a farmer has special need for electric power. 
The farmer needs electricity in his home to maintain a 
basic standard of living. He needs it in his business in 
order to improve production methods and decrease the 
costs of production. Increased industrial and farm activi-
ty increases the need for electricity on the farm and in 
unserved small towns to enable the farmer and the worker 
in rural industry better to serve the nation. Widespread 
rural electrification is long over-due in the United States. 
Fifteen years ago only one Nebraska farn1 in fifteen had 
electric service. Today, in spite of the long strides that 
have been 1nade toward the solution of the public prob-
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lem of bringing electric service to the farms of N ehraska, 
almost half of them are still without service. 
It is for these reasons that it is appropriate in this 
important field of rural electrification for the govern-
ment to take financial risks which private capital is 
unable to assume. The result is a new type of electric 
enterprise-one in which there is an unprecedented dis-
parity between capital investment and earning power. 
Considering the enormity of the public problem as well 
as the prospects for repayment, the investment is justi-
fied. The Government confidently expects that its REA 
loans will be repaid. But this expectation is based upon a 
look ahead- 25 to 35 years- and upon a maintenance 
of farm income at a decent American standard, to which 
electricity will greatly contribute. ~There is not the slight-
est inconsistency between this. belief . in the economic 
feasibility of rural electrification and our contention that 
earning power is the only proper criterion for valuation 
for tax purposes. If rural electric cooperatives had the 
earning power which is normally required by private 
capital in the business world, there would he a close and 
normal correlation between construction cost and a value 
based upon a capitalization or earnings. The fact is, 
however, that they probably will never have such earning 
power and certainly they do not have it in their early 
and development years. Considering the nature of the 
territory in which they operate--territory which private 
capital is unwilling to venture toward- they probably 
will never do more than break even in their profit and 
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loss account, after paying interest and making the proper 
charges for depreciation. 
This lack of net earning power is not due to ab-
normally low rates or inefficient management. Rates are 
closely comparable to those charged by utility companies 
in rural areas. Higher rates ·would prevent the extensive 
use of electricity for power which is possible on the farm 
and reduce the upward trend of net revenues. The opera-
ting expenses of these cooperative associations are at a 
low level that is unprecedented in the light and power 
industry. It is apparent therefore that present earnings 
of these electric cooperatives., as shown by their profit 
and loss statements, are an accurate index of earning 
power. Since earning power is the only proper criterion 
of value for tax purposes, the inquiry of taxing officials 
should be addressed to such net earnings rather than to 
construction cost. Before analyzing the tax status of 
typical electric cooperatives in the light of sound and 
lawful principles of valuation, it might be helpful to cite 
a number of leading court decisions which have estab-
lished such principles. 
We find some difficulty in discovering the reasons 
whcih prompted the Attorney General in reaching his 
conclusions. Nothing therein is revealed why the statu-
tory method he attacks would not result in these coopera-
tives paying a tax in proportion to the value of its prop-
erty. Although the Attorney General and counsel for the 
appellants herein 1nay differ as to what constitutes 
proper cirteria for determining value, yet this alone 
would not enable this Court to reach a proper conclusion. 
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In order that the Court may have some factual informa-
tion concerning these cooperatives, there is hereinafter 
set out the profit and loss statement of 3 of such coop-
eratives. There is also attached a statement of total 
number of miles of line of five of these electric coopera-
tives, the number of members so served, and the revenue 
per mile of line. There is added to this data a statement 
showing the average revenue per mile of all electric co-
operatives in the State of Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Idaho 
and Wyoming. 
May we point out the financial operation of at least 
three of these Utah Cooperatives, namely (1) Garkane 
Power Association, serving the rural areas of Sevier, 
Wayne, Piute, Garfield and Kane Counties in the State 
of Utah; (2) Uintah Basin Telephone Association, Inc., 
serving the rural areas of Duchesne and Uintah Counties 
in the State of Utah and (3) The South Central Utah 
Telephone Association, serving the rural areas of Sevier, 
Piute, Garfield, Kane and Iron Counties in the State of 
Utah. 
It is equally interesting to note that in five of the 
eleven cooperatives serving the rural population of the 
State of Utah, the total number of miles of line is 1964, 
while the total number of consumers served is 5423, re-
sulting in an average of 2.76 customers or consumers per 
mile of line. 
Considering the 949 active cooperative borrowers in 
operation in the U. S. for the year 1957, the median 
aveage miles for each cooperative in 1283, while the med-
ian average customers is 3640. This gives a national aver-
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age in these 949 cooperatives of 2.84 consumer per mile 
of line. There follows a tabulation of 4 of such coopera-
tives in Utah, 3 in Vermont, 10 in Virginia, 9 in Idaho 
and 10 in Wyoming, showing the revenue per mile of line 
in each of these cooperatives in each of these five states. 
It will be noted that the average revenue per mile in 
Utah iss $33.26-in Vermont the average revenue per 
mile iss $28.94, while the average in Virginia is $29.20, 
in Idaho $27.20 and in Wyoming $34.40. 
Exhibit "A", "B", "·C" and "D' 
EXHIBIT "A" 
GARKANE POWER ASSOCIATION 
NET OPERATING MARGINS- PROFIT OR LOSS 
Current Year 
12/31/48 -------·············-·······-···---·------·-----$ 9,199.40 
" I " I 49 ·-----·-······-·····--········-················· 35,360.95 
"I" /50 ···············-····-------·------··---··-······ 472.24 
"I" /51 ................................................ 14,736.89 
"I" /52 ··················-···-··-···----····---·-··---- 27,611.35 
"I" /53 ----··-·-----------·----·-----··--------··------ 16,284.86 
"I" /54 ············----·--·········--·······---·------· 4,620.79 
"I" /55 ................................................ 4,101.98 
"I" /56 ·····················-·····----·--···········-·- 8,781.13 
"I "/57 ................................................ 13,499.79 
"I" /58 ········----·---····---·······-······-·········· 13,577.51 
EXHIBIT "B" 
Previous Year 
$ 83,379.99 
118,740.94 
118,269.70 
133,006.59 
160,617.94 
176,902.80 
172,282.01 
176,383.99 
167,602.86 
154,103.07 
140,525.56 
UINTAH BASIN TELEPHONE ASSOCIATION, INC. 
INCOME STATEMENT 
Year Ending December 31, 1957 
Operating Revenues: 
Local Service Revenue ·············-·········-·--···-· 
Toll Service Revenues ............................... . 
Miscellaneous Operating Revenues ......... . 
Gross Revenues ................................... . 
Less: Uncollectible operating revenue ..... . 
Total Operating· Rev~nues ................... . 
Operating revenue deductions: 
Maintenance labor ........................................ $ 6,684.96 
Maintenance Materials & Supplies............ 2,255.85 
Other maintenance expenses .................... 4,602.91 
$42,823.76 
15,763.69 
4,706.53 
$63,293.98 
540.66 
$62,753.32 
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Other traffic expense --------------------------------
Salaries ----------------------------------------------------------
Other operating expenses: 
Adv. --------------------------------------------------------Directors Fees and expense _______________ _ 
Directory Expense ------------------------------
Area Survey ------------------------------------------
Insurance ----------------------------------------------
Legal ------------------------------------------------------
Office Supplies & expense ----------------
General expense ----------------------------------
Audit ------------------------------------------------------
Postage --------------------------------------------------
Rent for general office ------------------------
Stationery & printing ------------------------
Travel and incidental --------------------------
Depreciation --------------------------------------------------
Amortization of plant adjustments ........... . 
Operating taxes --------------------------------------------
Rental for lease of telephone plant ___________ _ 
General service and license ------------------------
Miscellaneous taxes ------------------------------------
Net operating income ------------------------
Other income: 
1,317.51 
6,017.25 
31.01 
1,165.95 
1,246.54 
161.32 
1,058.51 
178.85 
383.74 
940.44 
952.32 
369.11 
600.00 
1,106.23 
1,215.58 
18,648.59 
699.95 
5,404.83 
2,499.45 
1,722.06 
56.20 
Miscellaneous physical property........ 106.50 
Rental of poles & central office........ 1,233.59 
Interest on long term debt --------------------
$60,156.62 
2,596.70 
1,340.09 
3,936.79 
9,404.46 
Net (Loss) ------------------------------------------------------------ ( $5,467.67) 
Less $56.80 tax J IE entry 
EXHIBIT "D" 
Miles of line-608 
Gaskane 1957 (Utah 6) 
No. of consumers-2,042 
Operating loss-$140,525.56 (1949 to 1958 incl.) 
Revenue per mile-29.04 in 1957 
Moon Lake 1957 (Utah 8) 
Miles of line--1,113 
No. of consumers-2,907 
Operating loss-$19,787.00 
Revenue per mile--$61.75 
Miles of line--110 
Escalante Valley (Utah 10) 
No. of consumers-259 
Revenue per mile-$18.50 
Miles of line--98 
Howell Elec. (Utah 11) 
No. of consumers-162 
Revenue per mile--$23. 7 4 
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Dixie Rural (Utah 14 K) 
No. of miles-35 
No. of consumers-53 
Average Revenue per mile of 4 in. Utah, 3 in. Vermont, 10 in. 
Virginia, 9 in. Idaho, 10 in. Wyoming is: 
Utah Vermont Virginia Idaho Wyo. 
29.04 32.52 26.49 32.80 26.81 
61.75 28.55 37.15 24.80 29.57 
18.50 25.7 4 32.21 36.38 33.21 
23.7 4 28.07 22.60 32.53 
27.80 19.08 19.58 
78.85 25.19 49.46 
31.99 45.43 28.89 
31.16 9.50 33.78 
28.49 29.06 22.20 
19.83 67.93 
Utah -------------········-----$33.26 - 4 Idaho -------------------------- 27.20 - 9 
Vermont -------------------- 28.94 - 3 Wyo. -------------------------- 34.396-10 
Virginia --------·--·-------- 29.20 -10 
Average number of consumers served nationally, 1957 
Residential service. Farm and non-farm --------------------------------------- 91.4% 
Commercial & industrial --······-·--------··----------------------------------------------·- 7. 7% 
Other electric service .......................................................................... 0.9% 
Kilowatt-hour Sales: 
Residential service-farm & non-farm ········--····-·-··························· 71.3% 
Commercial & industrial .................................................................... 23.0% 
Other electric service ·················------·································-·--················ 4.1% 
To others for re-sale ·················-······-----················---··-·····--------------······ 1.6% 
Revenues: 
Residential service - Farm & non-farm ···········-······--·--·------·--·-······ 77.4% 
Commercial & industrial ·-·······--······---·-·········--·--·--·----------·········-········ 17.6% 
Other electric service ····------------······----------·····---······--------------····-········· 3.0% 
To others for re-sale --·-·-··-------------------------------------------···-···------·-------···- 0.6% 
The average monthly kilowat-hours sold per residential consumer 
during 1957 was 283, the average monthly bill was $7.85, and the 
average revenue per kilowat-hour was 2.77 cents. For commercial and 
industrial users, including schools, churches, etc., the average monthly 
usage during 1957 was 1,089 KWH, the average monthly bill was 
$21.22, and the average revenue per KWH was 1.95 cents. The average 
monthly energy use by residential consumers has more than doubled 
since 1949 while the average revenue per KWH has decreased by over 
one fourth during the same period. 
EXHIBIT "C" 
SOUTH CENTRAL UTAH TELEPHONE ASSOCIATION, INC. 
STATEMENT OF PROFIT & LOSS 
AS OF 
SEPTENBER 30, 1958 
Mouth of 
Revenues September 
Local Service Revenue-Orderville Exchange .... $ 546.30 
" " " Beryl Exchange ----·-···· 380.64 
" " " Kooshnrem Exchange.. 338.63 
" " " Escalante Exchange.... 197.67 
" " " Tropic Exchange ________ 157.05 
" " " Boulder Exchange ...... 127.50 
Total ·-·-·················-·-···-------······--············------------$1,7 4 7. 79 
Year to 
Date 
$ 4,552.45 
3,249.04 
3,066.02 
2,360.99 
1,528.37 
1,036.96 
$15,793.83 
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Toll Service Revenue-Beryl Exchange ............ 421.36 
" " " 
Escalante Exchange .... 286.25 
" " 
Orderville Exchange .... 437.32 
" " " 
Tropic Exchange ........ 194.50 
" " Koosharem Exchange .. 191.64 
" " " 
Boulder Exchange ...... 62.80 
Total --·--··----···-------·-----···---·-·------------------------------$1,593.87 Miscellaneous Operating Revenue ________________________ $ 151.54 
Total Operating Revenues ---·-------------·-·--·-----$3,493.20 
EXPENSES 
Depreciation ----------------------------------------------------------·---$1,174.93 
Maintenance Labor -------------------------------------------------- 556.73 
Interest to REA ----------------·--·---------------------------------- 535.67 
Office Salaries ·-----------·-------·-----·------------------------------- 414.48 
Maintenance Deduction.:; from Income ---------------- 138.79 
Maintenance Truck Expense ----------------------------·--· 165.57 
Power ····------·------------------------------------------------··-----··------ 127.52 
Other General Expenses ····------------------------------------ 187.29 
Legal ····-------------·-------------------------------------------·------------ -0-
Insurance ·---------------------------····------------·--------------------· 61.45 
Taxes - State, County and LocaL...................... 83.38 
Other Maintenance Expenses -------------------------------- 15.51 
Maintenance Materials & Supplies ---------------------· 47.41 
Travel --------------------------------------------·---·--·-·------------------ 77.46 
Supply Expense Clearing ---------·····-·-··-----------·--·---- -0-
Taxes - Federal -----·-·-------------------------------------------- 89.08 
Office Supplies & Expense ---------------------·-------------- 8.68 
Postage & Envelopes --------------------·----------------------- -0-
Rent ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 20.00 
Relief & Pensions -----------·----·--·-------------------------------- (6.44) 
Other Traffic Expenses --------------------------------------·--· 19.65 
Directors Fees -----------------------·-···--------------·------------· -0-
Stationery & Printing ·----------------·-·-·-···------------------ -0-
Total Operating Expenses ------------------------·---$3,717.16 
Net Loss for the Period ................................ $ 223.96 
2,922.15 
2,834.47 
2,773.85 
1,456.92 
1,448.40 
373.31 
$11,809.10 
$ 2,190.03 
$29,792.96 
$10,579.53 
4,649.69 
4,531.15 
3,578.84 
1,249.11 
1,101.40 
1,037.17 
819.00 
480.00 
472.73 
462.12 
333.65 
321.68 
289.92 
268.70 
253.99 
237.93 
220.26 
180.00 
177.53 
152.90 
135.00 
79.58 
$31,612.36 
$ 1,819.40 
SOUTH CENTRAL UTAH TELEPHONE ASSOCIATION, INC. 
STATEMENT OF PROFIT & LOSS 
AS OF FEBRUARY 28, 1959 
Month of 
Revenue February 
Local Service Revenue-Orderville Exchange .... $ 557.71 
" " " Beryl Exchange ------···· 381.80 
" " " Kosharem Exchange.... 340.55 
" ;; , Escalante Exchange.... 318.23 
Tropic Exchange ·------- 204.72 
Boulder Exchange ______ 127.50 " " " 
$1,930.51 
Toll Service Revenue-OrdervPle Exchange .... $ 264.07 
" " " Beryl Exchange .......... 252.73 
Year to 
Date 
$ 1,164.99 
793.62 
683.34 
609.86 
420.01 
258.90 
$ 3,930.72 
$ 659.29 
652.54 
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, 
" Escalante Excl1ange .... 172.75 , , 
" Tropic Exchange 111.84 
" " Koosharem Ex~hange .. 113.35 77 , 77 Boulder Exchange 27.13 
-M--
$ 941.87 
Miscellaneous Operating Revenues --------------------$ 248.05 
Total Revenues ------------------------------------------------$3,120.88 
Interest ----------------------------------------------------------------------
Maintenance Labor --------------------------------------------------
Taxes - State, County and Local ------------------------
Relief & Pensions ----------------------------------------------------
Other Miscellaneous Deductions from Income ___ _ 
Outside Services- Engineering, Auditing, etc. ___ _ 
Other Traffic Expense --------------------------------------------
Insurance Expense -----------------------···------------------------
Meals, Traveling & Incidental Expense --------------
Telephone Service ----------------------------------------------------
Office Supplies & Expense ------------------------------------
Vehicle Clearing Account --------------------------------------
Maintenance Materials & Supplies ----------------------
Rent----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Membership Fees in Trade Associations ------------
Directors Fees ----------------------------------------------------------
Station Removals & Changes --------------------------------
Stationery & Printing ---------~----------------------------------
479.10 
461.93 
300.00 
(12.88) 
139.13 
72.00 
155.17 
57.88 
28.50 
25.21 
34.30 
50.20 
43.44 
20.00 
42.30 
-o-
1.87 
14.85 
Total Expenses ------------------------------------------------$3,560.64 
Net Loss for the Period ------------·--·--··--··----------------$ 439.76 
437.65 
258.87 
228.71 
107.64 
$ 2,344.70 
$ 295.80 
$ 6,571.22 
$ 2,510.85 
1,072.87 
1,047.06 
709.74 
600.00 
283.36 
278.26 
213.55 
162.42 
115.76 
109.55 
67.01 
57.13 
55.62 
47.59 
44.35 
42.30 
36.00 
32.02 
14.85 
$ 7,500.29 
$ 929.07 
Sutherland Statutory Construction 3rd Ed. Vol 2-
Sec. 2102 to 2115 : 
"At common law the only statutes of which 
the Courts would take notice were public acts, and these 
were called general laws. Obviously, the constitutional 
provisions concerning general laws and law·s of a general 
nature used the tern1 in a different and n1ore limited 
sense. Although some courts followed the common law 
definition this was erroneous because a public act can be 
special or local as well as general. If the subject of the 
statute 1nay apply to and affect the people of every politi-
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cal subdivision of the State, it is a law of general nature 
and must have uniform operation ... A general law may 
operate only in a particular ·County, and only affect a 
small group of persons at the time of its enactment if 
the classification of the group is reasonable and if the 
statute will apply equally to all in a similar situation 
coming within its scope a law is general not because it 
operates on every person in the State, but because every 
person brought within the relations and circumstances 
provided for by the act is affected. See Martin v. Su-
perior Court of Sacramento, 194 Cal. 93, 227 P. 762 
(1924): In re Livingstone, 76 P. 2nd.1192 (1938) 
The court in Martin v. Superior Court of Sacramento 
County 227 P. P. 763-was confronted with the question 
of the constitutionality of a statute passed in 1923 which 
provided "In counties and cities and counties having a 
population of 100,000 inhabitants or over, such selection 
(of trial jurors) shall be made by a majority of the 
judges of the superior courts." By this enactment the 
basis of classification for the purpose of selecting jurors 
was changed. The court in this cause said : "It is con-
ceded, as indeed it must be, that where a classification of 
persons of things is distinctive and such distinction is 
based upon some constitutional or natural, or intrinsic 
distinction, laws may be applicable to such class alone, 
providing the act is uniform as to all persons or th2ngs 
within such class.-The amendment under consideration 
is not, in our opinion, a special law. It is a general law 
having a uniform operation upon a class of persons or 
things readily naturally differentiated from another class 
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of persons or things by reason of the necessities peculiar 
to the subject rnatter of the legislation. A law is not spe-
cial legislation merely because it does not apply to all per-
sons. It is a settled principle of constitutional law that 
the legislature may classify for the purpose of meeting 
different conditions, naturally requiring different legisla-
tion, in order that legislation may be adapted to the needs 
of the people. If the law is to bear equally upon all per-
sons, the legislature must classify whenever there exists a 
reason which may rationally be held to justify a diversity 
of legislation. In other words, different persons, different 
localities, and different· governmental organizations and 
agencies may justly be found by the legislature to stand 
in different relations to the law, and if the same law were, 
in such a situation, to be applied to all alike, it would not 
bear equally upon each of them. Darcy v. Mayor, etc. of 
the City of San Jose, 104 Cal. 462, 38 P. 500; In re Su-
mida, 177 Ca1388, 170 P. 823. 
The classification, however, must not be arbitrarily 
made for the mere purpose of classification, but must 
be based upon some distinction, natural, intrinsic, or con-
stitutional, which suggests a reason for and justifies the 
particular legislation. That is to say, not only must the 
class itself be germane to the purpose of the law, but 
the individual components of the class must he character-
ized by sOine substantial qualities or attributes which 
suggest the need for and the propriety of the legislation. 
Subject to these limitations a law is general despite the 
fact that it operates on]~, upon a class of individuals or 
things, if it applie~ equally to all persons or things within 
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the class to which it is addressed. (Pasadina v. Stimson 
91·Cal. 238, 27 P. 604; McDonald v. Conniff, 99 Cal. 386, 
34 P. 71; Title, etc., Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Gal. 
289,88 P. 356, 8 L.R.A. 682. 
1The power to thus classify necessarily carries with 
it a wide descretion in the exercise thereof. The authority 
and the duty to ascertain the facts which will justify 
classified legislation must of necessity rest with the legis-
lature, in the first instance, to whom has been given the 
power to legislate and not to the Courts, and the decision 
of the legislature in that behalf is ordinarily conclusive 
upon the Courts. Every presumption is in favor of validi-
ty of the legislative act, and the legislative classification 
will not therefore be disturbed unless it is palpably arbi-
trary in its nature and neither founded upon nor sup-
ported by reason. (In the matter of a proceeding to 
validate the Sutter-Butte by-Pass assessment No. 6 of the 
Sacramento and San Joaquin Drainage District (Cal. 
Sup.) 218 P. 27. It follows that in any given case if the 
existence of a state of facts of which the court may take 
judicial notice seems to have been made the basis of a 
particular piece of legislation, and if it may be reason-
ably said that such facts afford good ground for the 
making of a particular classification; the legislative en-
actment will be upheld, although the reason therefor does 
not appear prima facie in the law itself. Stevenson v. 
Colgan 91 Cal. 649, 27 P. 1089·; Grumhach v. Lelande, 
154 Cal. 679, 98 P. 1059; Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. S. 311, 
27 Sup ct. 289, 51 L'. Ed. 499. 
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In determining the need and propriety of classified 
legislation, where the same does not appear on the face 
of the legislative enactment, the Court may resort to its 
judicial knowledge of the contemporaneous conditions 
and situation of the people, the existing economic, socio-
logic and civic policy of the State, and all other matters 
of common knowledge - In other words, "where the dis-
cretion so to classify is vested in the legislature, the 
selection of a limit is a legislative power which will be 
judicially reviewd only in a plain case of abuse." 
In Bacon v. Walker reported in 204 U. S. P. 311, 
the factual situation involved a law of Idaho which pro-
vided a civil damage of $100 for sheep trespassing within 
2 miles of a dwelling house. The action was brought in 
the Justice's Court, appealed to the District Court and 
finally affirmed by the Supreme Court of Idaho. In 
error to the Supreme Court of Idaho the case was heard 
by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
The Idaho Act provided: "Sec. 1210. It is not lawful 
for any person owning or having charge of sheep to herd 
the same, or permit them to be herded, on the land or 
possessory claims of other persons, or to herd the same 
or permit them to graze within 2 miles of the dwelling 
house of the owner or owners of said possessory claim." 
The act then provides the penalty for damages. The 
plaintiff in error alleges, among other things that the 
Idaho law makes a discrimination that is arbitrary. The 
·u. S. Supreme Court held: "The laws and policy of a 
State may be framed and shaped to suit its conditions 
of climate and soil-The sele~ction of some limt is a legis-
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lative power, and it is only against the .abuse of that 
power if ,at all, that the courts may interpose. But the 
abuse must be shown. It is nO't shown by quoting the pro-
vision which expresses the lim~t. The mere distance ( 2 
miles) expressed shows nothing. The Court concludes 
that such a statute is a vindication from the accusation of 
being an arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination 
against the sheep industry. The statute was sustained as 
a constitutional exercise of the power of the state on ac-
count of the peculiar nature of the right and the objects 
upon which it was exerted, for the purpose of protecting 
all of the collective owners. 
Returning to Sutherland Statutory Construction the 
author says: "The form of enactment is not conclusive. 
The courts will consider the entire act along with the 
surrounding circumstances, the reasons for passage, and 
the purposes to be accomplished. An act general in form 
but special in fact will be treated judicially, as a special 
act, but this does not mean that the act is unconstitutional 
-The uniformity that is required is to prevent the grant-
ing to any person, or class of persons, the privileges or 
immunities which upon the same terms do not belong to 
all persons - When an act is assailed as class or special 
legislation, the attack is usually based on the claim that 
there are persons or things similarly situated to those 
embraced in the act, and which by the terms of the act are 
excluded from its operation. The question then is whether 
the persons or things embraced by the act form by them-
selves a proper and legitimate class with reference to the 
purposes of the act. Constitutions do not forbid a reason-
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able and proper classification of the objects of legislation. 
The question is, what is reasonable and proper - Most 
litigation concerns the reasonableness of the limits im-
posed on the operation of the contested act - The 
standards used by the Courts have been stated in many 
different ways. Some Courts have held a general act 
applies alike to all of a certain class and operates uni-
formly on all persons in a similar category; that is to 
say, when a class is determined by the legislature, in order 
to sustain the act, all in the class must receive uniform 
treatment. The author, at this point, cites the case of 
Clear Lake Coop Livestock Shippers Ass'n v. Weir, re-
ported in 206 N. W. at page 279, the facts being these: 
The 39th general assembly of the State of Iowa, author-
ized by law the creation of agricultural marketing 
agencies for the sole purpose of marketing farm pro-
ducts. Each association created thereunder, adopted b~'­
laws, which required the membership to sell all its live-
stock through this agency. The appellant, being a n1ember 
of the appellee, was charged with selling certain of his 
livestock outside this marketing agency. On appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Iowa it was contended that the act 
violated Section 6 of Article I, of the Constitution whicli 
reads: "all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform 
operation; the general assen1bly shall not grant to any 
citizen, or class of ritizens, privileges or imn1unities, 
which, upon the sa1ne terms shall not equally belong to 
all citizens." It was contended that the power conferred 
upon associations organized under this chapter is with-
held from individual or voluntary, co-operative, unincor-
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, , porated associations engaged in the same line of industry, . 
and therefore its provisions are discriminatory and arbi-
trary and not based upon an obvious or natural classifica-
tion or industry. In answer to this contention the 
Supreme Court said: "The contention overlooks the pur-
pose of the act. Its design was to secure unity and 
cooperation among all producers of livestock in order 
that greater efficiency might be secured in selling live-
stock on foreign markets - The right of the legislature 
to enact legislation for the incorporation of non-profit 
sharing, cooperative associations is not questioned. Per-
haps the legislature taking cognizance of altered condi-
tions in farming and other industries, believed a change 
of public policy should be adopted." The author of this 
text continues: "Others say if the basis of classification 
is valid it is wholly immaterial how many or how few 
there are in the class." The author continues "authorities 
are divided on the propriety of judicial review of legis-
lative classifications. Most authorities agree, however, 
that it is not necessary that every city or county be in-
cluded, but none can be excluded in such a manner that 
they can never come within the legislative classification. 
Thus, classification must be prospective and not permit 
the future entrance into the class when its qualification 
and standards have been met. The restriction may place 
either wide or narrow limits on the class, but the nearer 
a classification comes to total generality the more sus-
ceptible it is to attack. A valid classification must include 
all who "naturally" belong to the class, all who posess a 
common disability, attribute or classification, and there 
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must be some natural and m:~bstantial differentiation be-
tween those included in the class and those it leaves un-
touched - Classifications also have been sustained on 
the ground of necessity. An actual basis for differing 
treatment must be established on the basis of differences 
in the situation and subject matter included and excluded 
from the class. Using these tests, if it is determined that 
there is no reason for the classification, the rule that the 
legilative determination of fact is binding will not be ap-
plied, and the act will be declared unconstitutional~ but 
generally the courts will exercise every presumption in 
favor of the validity of the legislative determination. In 
Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, Justice 
Cordozo said, "Time with its tides brings new condtions 
which must be cared for by new laws. Sometimes the new 
conditions affect the members of a class. If so, the cor-
recting statute may be as narrow as the mischief. The 
constitution does not prohibit special laws inflexibly and 
always. It permits them where there are special evils with 
which the general laws are incompetent to cope. The 
special public purpose will sustain the special form -
The problem in the last analysis is one of legislative 
policy, with a wide margin of discretion conceded to the 
lawmakers. Only in the case of plain abuse will there be 
revision by the courts. - If the evil to be corrected can 
be seen to be merely fanciful, the injustice or the wrong 
illusory, the courts n1ay intervene and strike the special 
statute down.- If special circnn1stances have developed 
of such a nature as to call for a new rule, the special act 
will stand." 
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In the case of Broadbent et al v. Gibson et al, 105 U. 
53, this ·Court was concerned \Yith classification of prop-
erty as affected by the Sunday closing law. In discussing 
this question of classification this court said : "In deter-
mining whether or not this classification is unconstitu-
tional, it must be remembered that discrimination is the 
very essence of classification and is not objectionable 
unless founded upon distinctions which the court is com-
pelled to find unreasonable. (Citing State v. Mason, 94 
U. 501, 78 P. 2nd 920; State v. Lormis, 75 Mont 88, 242 
P. 344.) The legislature has a wide discretion in deter-
mining what shall come within the class of permitted 
activities and what shall be excluded. (Citing Koman v. 
St. Louis, 316 Mo. 9; 289 S.W. 838; Stewart Motor Co. 
v. ·City of Omaha, 120 Neb. 776, 235 N.W. 332; State v. 
Diamond 56 N.D. 854, 219 N.W. 831; State v. Dolan, 13 
Idaho 693, 92 P. 995.) 
"A court is not concerned with the wisdom or policy 
of the law and cannot substitute its judgment for that of 
the legistlative body. If reasonable minds differ as to the 
reasonableness of the regulation, the law must be up-
held." Justesen's Food Stores v. City of Tulore, 43 Cal. 
App. 2nd 616, 111 P. 2nd 424,427. 
In State v. Mason 94 U. 501- This court considered 
the constitutionality of Chapter 4, Laws of Utah 1935, 
insofar as it requires a license to be obtained by persons 
other than commission merchants, who for the purpose 
of resale obtain from farmers possession or control of 
farm products without paying cash for the same at the 
time of obtaining such control or possession. The defend-
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ant was convicted of this offense and appealed urging, 
among other things, that it is a denial of equal protection 
clause of the constitution by creating unreasonable dis-
criminations. The court held: "To be unconstitutional as 
discriminatory, the discrimination of a statute must be 
unreasonable or arbitrary and a classification is never 
unreasonable or arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion 
features so long as there is some basis for the differenta-
tion between classes or subject matters included as com-
pared to those excluded from its operation and if the 
differentation bears a reasonable relation to the purposes 
to be accomplished by the Statute. 
The objects and purposes of a statute present a stan-
dard for determining propriety of classifications as re-
spects question whether statute is unconstitutionally 
discriminatory. 
The Supreme Court in State v. Loomis, 75 Mont. 88, 
242 P. 344 (1925) considered a Sunday closing law of the 
State of Montana which provided that dance halls must 
close on Sunday. The dance hall closing provision per-
mitted theater, playhouses and other forms of entertain-
Iuent to remain open, and further provided that this act 
would not apply to dance halls and pavilions as are main-
tained or conducted in public parks or playgrounds where 
no admission is charged. The appellant was convicted of 
keeping open a dance hall on Sunday. The Supreme Court 
held : "It is conceded, as it must be, that it is competent 
for the lawmakers to classify subjects of legislation and 
to deal differently with the different classes created, if 
the classification is reasonable and not a mere artificial 
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14th amendment to the federal constitution. Whether the 
classification made by the amended .Act i's reasonable was 
a matter for legislative determination in the first in-
stance, and every reasonable presumption will be in-
dulged in favor of the validity of the act; in other words, 
it will be presumed that the classi'fication is reasonable, 
and the defendant must assume the burden of showing 
that there is not any admissable hypothesis upon which 
it can be justified." 
The Court in this case concluded that classification 
of subjects for the purpose of legislation does not depend 
upon scientific or marked differences in things or persons 
or in their relations, it being sufficient to withstand the 
charge of discrimination - the very essence of classifi-
cation - and not objectionable unless founded on dis-
tinctions unreasonable or purely fictitious. .Am. Sugar 
Ref. Co. v. Louisiana U. S. Reports 179-89. 
A license tax upon those not excepted - P. alleges 
tax does not impose equally such tax on all who refine 
sugar and molasses. The U. S. Supreme Court held: "The 
act in question does undoubtedly discriminate in favor of 
a certain class of refiners, but this discrimination, if 
founded upon a reasonable distinction in principle, is 
valid, of course, if such discrimination were purely arbi-
trary, oppressive or capricious, and made to depend upon 
differences of color, race, nativity, religions, opinions, 
political affiliations or other considerations having no 
possible connection with the duties of citizens as tax-
payers, such exemption would be pure favoritism, and a 
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denial of the equal protection of the laws to the less 
favored classes. But from time out of mind it has been 
the policy of this government, not only to classify for 
purposes of taxation, but to exempt producers from the 
taxation of the methods employed by them to put their 
production upon the market. So, too, this court has had 
repeated occasion to sustain discriminations founded 
upon reasons much more obscure than this. Thus in Rail-
road Co. v. Richmond 96 U.S. 521, a Municipal ordinance 
was sustained declaring that no car or vehicle of any 
kind "belonging to or used by the Richmond, Fredericks-
burg & Potomac Railroad Co. shall be drawn or propelled 
by steam'' upon a certain street, although no other com-
pany was named in the ordinance, the Court held that no 
other corporation had the right to run locomotives in that 
street, no other corporation could be in a like situation, 
and that the ordinance, while apparently limited in its 
operation, was general in its effect, as it applied to all 
who could do what was prohibited." "All laws should be 
general in their operation, and all places within the same 
city do not necessarily require the same local regulation. 
While locomotives may with great propriety be excluded 
from one street, it would be unreasonable to exclude them 
from all." In :Missouri Railroad Co. v. Mackey, 127 U.S. 
205, it was said: "and when legislation applies to particu-
lar bodies or associations, imposing upon them additional 
liabilities, it is not open to the objection that it denies to 
them the equal protection of the laws, if all persons 
brought under its influence are treated alike under the 
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same conditions." To the same effect is Walston v. Nevin, 
128 u. s. 578. 
In Bell's Gap Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania 134 U. S. 
:232 the Court said: ".All such regulations so long as they 
proceed within reasonable limits and general usage, are 
within the discretion of the legislature or the people of 
the State in framing their constitution." 
CONCLUSION 
There remains but little that can be said in summa-
tion. The plaintiff in this cause is convinced that the duty 
imposed upon the taxing authority is not an easy one. 
To determine "a uniform and equal rate of assessment 
and taxation on all tangible proprety in the State accord-
ing to its value in money," requires both wisdom and 
patience. 
Despite the effort in this behalf, this court which 
must ultimately decide and determine these controversies, 
is probably more keenly aware of the many desparities 
in our taxing effort, than is any other agency or instru-
mentality of government. To reach a plateau of greater 
equality, may require a new base upon which the tax is 
levied and laid. Until then, the inequalities that spring 
from this system, must be tolerated by a patient citizenry 
until a rule or formula emerges with judicial sanction. 
The plaintiff earnestly urges that the legislative 
formula provided in Section 16-6-16 and 16-6-17 provides 
a yardstick or method of determining value which secures 
for assessment purposes a valuation fair and equitable 
in comparison with and cmnmensurate with the valuation 
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of other kinds of property. When the valuation thus se-
cured is such that if the uniform and equal rate of taxa-
tion is applied, the property is taxed in the same propor-
tion to its value as is all other tangible property, the 
method of arriving at the assessed valuation is not sub-
ject to constitutional objections as violation of Article 
13. The selection of some limit ($50 times the number of 
miles of primary distribution or transmission lines -
$10 times the number of circuit miles) is a legislative 
power, andit is only against the abuse of that power if 
at all, that the courts may interpose. But the abuse must 
be shown. 
All such regulations so long as they proceed within 
reasonable limits and general usage, are \vithin the di8-
cretion of the legislative or the people of the State in 
framing their constitutions. 
To be unconstitutional as discriminatory, the dis-
crimination of the statute must be unreasonable or arbi-
trary, and a classification is never unreasonable or arbi-
trary in its inclusion or exclusion features, so long as 
there is some basis for the differentation between classes 
or subject 1natters. If reasonable 1ninds differ as to the 
reasonableness of the classification, the law must be up-
held. 
Assaying the instant 1natter new before this C<>urt, 
we very respectfully submit that Sections 16-6-16 and 16-
6-17 do not contravene Article 13 or Article 6 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah. 
Respectfully sub1nitted, 
George E. Stewart 
Ferdinand Erickson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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